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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

In this record there is at no place found an attack by
respondents on the validity of the zoning ordinance.
Neither does there appear any attack by appellants on
1

the legality of the existence of the Board of Adjustment,
nor any attack upon its jurisdiction to act within the
proper scope of its statutory functions.
What divides us is chiefly the matter of the extent
of the power of the Board of Adjustment, that is to say,
it is appellants' contention that the Board of Adjustment can not directly or indirectly exercise the broad
powers of the City Commission with respect to zoning.
In other words, it cannot change the boundaries of zoning districts nor create a new zone of one class within
another zone but must at all times act in general harmony with the zone uses as prescribed by the City CommissiOn.
It must be remembered at all times that difference in
zones essentially depends upon usc differences, and in
this respect from the beginning of zoning laws business
uses have been sharply distinguished from residence
uses.
Subordinately to this general line of demarcation
there has been and properly so, sub-classification as between different businesses in business zones, and also
sub-classification in residence zones with respect to size
and character of residence property buildings, for example, two or three family dwellings, apartment houses,
churches, etc. Also minor considerations such as distances from lot lines, area, ways, etc., appear, which, as
we contend, come properly within the jurisdiction of the
Adjustment Board, always subject to a de novo review
by the duly constituted courts.
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With this notion there is no overlapping of jurisdiction or function of the proper legislative body (the City
Commission) and the Board of Adjustment, and there
arises no question of unconstitutional delegation of
power to the Board of Adju:otment, and the system is
harmonious, sensible and suited to practical realities as
well as to traditional notions of jurisprudence.
Without analysis of the cases, as it seems to us, the
respondents have cited numerous cases indiscriminately
as supposed to be illustrative of various points, but an
examination of such authorities shows that many of
them have no application to the particular point to which
they are cited, although the great number of them do
bear on the fundamental contentions as we have outlined
them.
Some of the authorities cited are not as helpful as
they would be had the courts not been limited in the
scope of their review. Happily, here the court is not
limited in any wise in that respect.
·we shall examine respondents' cases in detail so far
as they bear upon the questions here, and ·we submit that
a reading of those cases will result in the conclusion that
at least ninety percent of them are in harmony with
our contention.
On page ten of brief occurs the first case that
apposite.

IS

L. & M. Investment Co. vs. Cutler (Ohio), 180

N. E. 379.
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From this case is quoted an excerpt to the effect
that the Board of Appeals is the proper body to determine the matter of unusual hardship, rc::mlting from
a compliance with the strict letter of the zoning ordinance.
From this doctrine counsel have deduced the conclusion that the order of the Board of Adjustment is to be
regarded as having weight in the courts on the trial of
the review proceedings which hy the statute is made
plenary and de novo.
That such a conclusion is logically drawn is of course
inconceivable and contrary to universal juriclicial conceptions.
On the next page the point is made that there is a
presumption in favor of the correctness of the determination of the board. This of course cannot be true where
the trial is de novo. Moreover, the matter of the scope
of the powers of the Board of Adjustment involves
purely a question of law.
Let us now look at the cases cited by respondents.
In the Cutler case (just cited), the defendant sought
a permit to remodel an existing structure for usc as a
sanitarium (a use not prohibited by the ordinance) but
the building did not have the proper amount of setback
from the street that would have been required of a new
building. The board granted the permit and its action
was upheld, the court holding that the ''use" being
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within the ordinance, the provision as to setback under
the circumstances was a proper matter for the board of
appeals, the building having been constructed prior to
the passage of the zoning ordinance.
In Home for Hebrew Infants vs. Walsh (Hand
Realty Co.) 227 N. Y. S., 570, the court annulled the action of the board of appeals in permitting a garage in a
residence district. The court said:
''The purchaser buying property in restricted
residential districts cannot be heard to complain
because of small profits arising from confining him
to residential uses of this property. He is presumed
to buy with his eyes open."
The court quoted with approval from the court of
appeals in
People vs. Walsh, 148 N. E., 760:
''The mere fact that a garage is more profitable
than any other structure is not sufficient evidence
of hardship."
In Revorg Healty Co. vs. "Walsh, the court said:
Unless ''impossible to use the property for any
other purpose than a gasoline service station, respondent has not shown practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships sufficient to exempt it from the
general rule.''

5

In In re Dawson (Okla.), 277 Pac., 226, the court
affirmed the district court's affirmance of the Board of
Adjustment which denied a permit to conduct a funeral
home in a restricted district.
In that case, unlike in the case at bar, the property
owner attacked the validity of the zoning ordinance.
The court quoted with approval from the Fordham
Manor case (N. Y.) 155 N. E., 575, to the effect that the
power to change the map (the use map) is reserved to
the board of estimate and apportionment (like here to
the City Commission), and the power of the Board of
Appeals is confined to "variations in special cases to
meet some unusual emergency, some unnecessary hardship.'' And the court emphasized the very limited power
of the Board of Adjustment as a premise for holding
that no legislative power had been delegated to such
board. The intimation is strong, indeed, irresistible,
that upon a holding that the Board of Adjustment had
the power to change the use, the ordinance would have
been held void as an improper delegation of power to
such board.
In Bellofatto vs. Board of Adjustment (N. J.), 141
At. 781, the court dismissed a writ of certiorari, and so
affirmed the Board of Adjustment in denying a permit
for a service station in a residence district zoned as
residential. The court as to presumption as to the rightness of the action of the Board merely assumed such presumption because of the entire absence of evidence on the
point.
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In Sundlun vs. Zoning Board (R. I.), 145A. 451, the
Board of Review denied a permit for a gas station. But
the holding was that the vicinity was in fact of a business character and the court in effect held that if the
zoning ordinance prohibited such use it would be unconstitutional. The question of the power of the Board
\Vas not involved as it is in the case at bar because there
the Board was expressly by the statute given the power
to permit the proposed use which fact the court specially
noted.
In Drabble vs. Zoning Board of Review (R. I.), 159
At. 828, the court affirmed the action of the zoning board
in refusing to permit an extension of a non-conforming
use.
In Norcross vs. Board (.Mass.), 150 N. E. 887, the
court held that its power of review was very limited,
and that it could not properly annul the action of the
board in granting a variance as to the height of a building, but it took occasion to say that the Board's power
was designed to be sparingly exercised. It said:
''It is only in rare instances and under exceptional circumstances that relaxation of the general
restrictions established by the statute ought to be
permitted. The power granted is only for the relief
of specific instances peculiar in their nature. It
does not extend to modification or changes of essential partieulars or the scheme of the zoning act. It
does not include immediate or prospective changes
in boundary lines of districts.''

7

It also said :
"Financial considerations alone, however, cannot govern the action of the board.''
Zahn vs. Board, 27 4 U. S. 32G; 71 L. 107 4, il-l not in
point.
Court held that its judgment is not to be substituted
for the judgment of the legislative body. (Not the Board
of Appeals.)
In Altschul vs. Ludwig (N. Y.), 111 N. E. 216, the
court held that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction
prohibiting the approval of plans contrary to the building code, and that the board of appealH had no power
to permit a prohibited use.
The Nectow case, U. S. 72 L. 842, is not in point. It
simply held that a particular zoning ordinance was void.
In Allen vs. City of Patterson (N. J.), 121 At. 610,
the board of appealH permitted a variance of a private
garage in respect of the distance only from the highway
under circumstances showing that unless such variance
were granted the private garage could not be built at all.
St. Albens-Springfield Corp. vs. Connell, 257 N. Y.
73, docs not involve the question of the extent of the
power of the board of appeals to vary. It holds that the
zoning ordinanec itself in its application to the property
owner was unconstitutional.
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People vs. Leo, 173 N. Y. S. 217, is not at all in point.
In the ca:,;e of People vs. Walsh (Fordham Manor YS.
Walsh), 155 N. K 575, the extent of tlle power of the
board to vary was not directly inYolYed or decided but
the court aHsnmed that it bad some power to permit a
public garage in a residence distriet. The court held,
however, that there was no sho\ving of practical difficulty or urmeces:,;ary hardship. rrhe court said:
''Presumably t1Jis owner who acquired the parcels with notice of zoning resolution paid a consideration appropriate to the limitation of the use. There
is no elemeut of the unexpected or the incalculable
to aggravate his plight,'' and,
''The power to change the map is reserved by
the charter to the board of estimate and apportionmeut. rl'lle power of the board of appeals is
confined to variation:,; iu special cases to meet some
unusual emergency, some unnecessary hardship.''
In Levy vs. Board of Stawlards and Appeals (N.Y.),
196 N. E. 284, the board had granted au applicatiou for
a variauce to permit a gasoliue service station. This
order was annulled by the appellate division, and the
court of appeals affirmed.
The court said, citing Dowsey vs. Keusington (N. Y.
177 N. E. 427), tlmt the zouiug ordimmce itself might
be inntlicl in some cases but (like in the case at bar)
"here, howeYer, the owuer doe:,; uot challenge the validity of the general restrictions ereated by the zoning
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ordinance. He asks for dispensation from the letter of
such restrictions otherwise applicable to his property.''
And:
''The power to grant in a specific case a variation
is subject to express limitations and to
limitations dearly implicit in the ordinance, no
power has been (~onferred upon the board of standards and appeals to review the legislative general
rules regulating the use of land.
It may not
determine what restrictions should be imposed upon
property in a particular disti·iet.
It may
not amend such general rules or change the boundary of the districts where they are applicable.''
And:
"It has been entrusted only with power to grant
a variation in specific cases where strict enforcement of the letter of restriction would cause practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship, even then
it may act only where the variation is in harmony
with the general intent of the zoning restrictions.''
''Only ~where the burden of a general restriction
creates a special hardship upon a particular owner
can the grant of a special privilege to him in truth
promote equal justice, that is not shown here. The
board of standards and appeals has granted a variation upon proof and finding of hardship due to
general conditions existing in the neighborhood
which may call for the exercise of legislative action
in amending the rule but from which exemption
cannot be granted by an administrative board. Its
power is eonfined to relief in proper case from
hardship unnecessarily caused by application of a
general restriction to a particular piece of land.
It may not destroy the general restriction by piece-
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meal exemption of pieces of land equally subject to
the hardship created in the restriction, nor arbitrarily grant to an individual a special privilege denied to others.''
People vs. Novick Co., 283 N. Y. S. 762, is not helpful because facts do not appear, and only a memorandum
opinion filed.
Bradley vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment (Mass.),
130 N. E. 8!)2, is exceq)ted from alHl, strangely enough
re:,.;pondents italieise the very proposition that is again:,.;t
them. True enough the court does hold that the legislature of a State may delegate to a municipal body or board
the power to zone. This is generally held to be the law
and is uot questioned here by any party. Here, however,
the statutes disclose that such delegated power to make
zoning re:,.;tridious is in the city commission.
In the Bradley case such power was expressly delegated by the legislature to the board of zoning adjustment.
Chapter 488, Statutes of Massachusetts, 1924, expressly provided that the board of zoning adjustment
"may, subject to the following conditions, change the
boundaries of the districts by changing the zoning map,
etc.''
Why such case is cited by respondents in this case is
beyond our powers of imagination, unless it be that such
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case seems to have successfully fooled the Montana court
in the Freeman case.
St. Basil's Church vs. Kerner, 211 N. Y. S. 470, is
likewise distinguishable from the case at bar because
of the express power given to the board of appeals to
permit a variation as to "use." This point was noticed
by the court in that case.
In Dowsey vs. Kingston (N. Y.), 177 N. E. 427, the
land owner did not apply to the board of appeals but
brought a suit in equity to have the zoning ordinance
declared invalid as to him. He prevailed upon that contention. In that case the defendant urged that the plaintiff should have sought relief before the board of appeals but the court of appeals of New York held that such
matter was not for the board of appeals. That its powers were altogether too limited to take care of the situation.
In the case of Spencer-Sturla Co. vs. Memphis
(Tenn.) 290 S. W. 614, the plaintiff in error had been
prosecuted by the city of Memphis for maintaining an
undertaking establishment contrary to the ordinance in
a restricted district. The conviction was affirmed on
the ground that the zoning ordinance was within the
power of the city.
It was claimed that the ordinance was invalid because
of the creation of a zoning board of appeals with power
similar to the board of adjustment here on the theory
that there was unwarranted delegation of power to such
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board of appeals, the court however answered this objection by saying, that the powers of the board were so
limiteu (as we contenu here) that there was no delegation of the fundamental power of the city with respect
to zoning, and that the board was not ''a law unto itself.''
McCord vs. Ed Bond and Condon Co. (Ga.), 165 S. E.
590, does not aid respondents. There the board of zoning appeals had granted the defendants a permit to maintain an undertaking establishment. Such permit was not
granted under any general power to vary from the strict
letter in case of hardship, etc. On the contrary, the
board of zoning appeals under the ordinance was given
the express power to permit such particular use. That
portion of the oruinance is quoted in the opinion and it
was becam;e of this express power that the action of the
board was sustained.
In Construction Co. vs. Jackson ( l\id.), 137 At., 278,
the plaintiff sought manuamus to compel the issuance of
a permit for certain builuing construction, contrary to
the restrictions of the zoning ordinance, plaintiff failed
because of a holding that the ordinance was valid. The
plaintiff there contended that tlw ordinance ~was invalid
by reason of the authority therein giveu to the board of
zoning appeals, to permit certain variances. rrlw plaintiff contendeu this "to he au uucoustitutional delegation of unlimited discretion."
The court held the objection uutenahle because of the
very limiteu power of the hoanl of zoniug appeals.
13

Facey vs. Leo (N.Y.), 130 N. E., 910, is not helpful,
as there is no opinion in either court.
Weaver vs. Bishop (Okla.), G2 P. 2, 83:3, dom.; not
involve the power of the board of appeals. In that case
defendants were held entitled to maintain a gas station
for the reason that there was no rcstrict,ion against such
use in the zoning ordinance.
In Tau Alpha Holding Corporation vs. Board of Adjustment (Fla.), 171 So., 819, the board of adjustment had
granted a restaurant owner a temporary permit to replace a frame building with a brick building in a residence district. It appeared that the property was in a
business district when the zoning ordinance was adopted.
The property was in fact in a business district, and during the litigation the city rezoned the territory, and zoned
it as a business district. The case of course became moot.
Nevertheless, the court apparently decided that the
board of adjustment was right but it said that the ordinance under review ''does not give the board of adjustment power to change zoning lines or make other material or permanent changes in the ordinance as enacte(l
by the city."
There is no business structure within nine-tenths of
a block in any direction from the Tracy property. The
zoning restriction applies to all of such property. It
is a general condition, a general restriction.
Counsel say that the spirit of the ordinance was observed. This is contrary to the law and the physical
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facts. The spirit of the ordinance is that gasoline stations are excluded from this area. The spirit of the ordinance, of course, has relation to the uses to which
property may be put.
Again it is respectfully submitted that the judgment
and decree should be reversed.
E. A. WALTON,
Pro Se and Attorney for other Appellants.
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